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Research  in the economics of the labour market when there are search   
frictions started in the 1960s, with inﬂuential contributions from George 
Stigler (1962), John McCall (1970) and the papers collected in Edmund 
Phelps et al. (1970). Of course, as is common in economics, this was not 
the ﬁrst time that economists took seriously the role of search frictions in 
their research. Insightful discussions of the role of frictions in labour mar-
ket equilibrium can be found much earlier, in books by John Hicks (1932)   
and William Hutt (1939). But it was not until the late 1960s that formal 
mathematical models of individual behaviour and labour market equilibrium 
appeared.
The development of formal mathematical models with search frictions 
coincided with the time that I was looking for a topic for my PhD research.2 
Two things about search impressed me most. In the Phelps volume, search 
was claimed as a microfoundation for the natural rate of unemployment, in-
troduced just a year or two before by Milton Friedman (1968) and Edmund 
Phelps (1967), and for the inﬂation-unemployment trade-off (the Phillips 
curve). It was also claimed, by Axel Leijonhufvud (1968) in particular, that it 
could provide a microfoundation for Keynes’s concept of effective demand: 
the idea was that the job seeker could make her demand for goods effective 
only after she succeeded in locating a mutually acceptable job match.
The articles in the Phelps volume, however, especially those by Phelps 
(1970) and Dale Mortensen (1970) which had explicit models of the Phillips 
curve, required a wage distribution to obtain the microfoundations of the 
Phillips curve. As Peter Diamond (1971) and Michael Rothschild (1973) 
pointed out, this was not consistent with the other assumptions of the   
models.3 Leijonhufvud’s claims also required something more than search. 
1  I have beneﬁted from discussions with my two co-winners, Peter Diamond and Dale   
  Mortensen, and from comments from Gary Fethke, Yannis Ioannides, Rachel Ngai and   
 Robert  Shimer.
2 This timing coincided with my ﬁrst meeting with Dale Mortensen, who was a visitor at the   
 University of Essex when I was ﬁnishing my undergraduate and Master’s studies there, but   
 our  collaboration had to wait for another twenty years to materialise.
3 Another  prominent critic of the papers in the Phelps volume, which inﬂuenced the literature   
  that followed, was Tobin (1972).
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They required either wage rigidity or absence of capital markets. Dealing 
with these two apparently unconnected issues appeared to be important 
items on the research agenda of the macroeconomics of the labour market. 
Both the Phillips curve and Keynesian demand management played a key 
role  in both macroeconomic research and policy, yet they lacked good 
theoretical foundations.4
MATCHING FRICTIONS AND TWO-SIDED SEARCH
One of the appeals of early search theory was that it appeared realistic. The 
widely used ILO/OECD deﬁnition of unemployment is one of workers 
not in a job, looking for one, and available to take one. This was precisely 
the deﬁnition of unemployment used in search theory. In earlier theory, 
both neoclassical and Keynesian, the unemployed are not doing anything   
connected with their state. They might be enjoying temporary bouts of 
leisure or be idle waiting for a job to open up, but they are not looking for 
a job. In the Phelps volume, however, as in the important paper by McCall 
(1970), the worker is searching for a wage offer from a ﬁxed distribution of 
wages, and if she is unemployed it is because she has failed to locate a high 
enough wage offer. This did not seem to be consistent with our intuition of 
what makes one unemployed for long periods of time, or with the view of   
unemployment taken by applied labour economists and ofﬁcial statistical 
agencies. It also appeared inconsistent with equilibrium  in markets with 
search frictions, at least back then.
Although there were many attempts to derive an equilibrium wage 
distribution for markets with search frictions, I took a different approach 
to labour market equilibrium that could be better described by the term 
“matching”. The idea is that the job search underlying unemployment in the 
ofﬁcial deﬁnitions is not about looking for a good wage, but about looking 
for a good job match. Moreover, it is not only the worker who is concerned 
to ﬁnd a good match, with the ﬁrm passively prepared to hire anyone who 
accepts its wage offer, but the ﬁrm was also equally concerned with locating a 
good match before hiring someone.
The foundation for this idea is that each worker has many distinct features, 
which make them suitable for different kinds of jobs. Job requirements vary 
across ﬁrms too, and employers are not indifferent about the type of worker 
that they hire, whatever the wage. The process of matching workers to jobs 
takes time, irrespective of the wage offered by each job. A process whereby 
both workers and ﬁrms search for each other and jointly either accept or 
reject the match seemed to be closer to reality.
This approach to search has the advantage that it makes unemployment 
neither “voluntary” nor “involuntary”, concepts that caused a lot of confusion 
and fruitless debate in the literature. Unemployment is instead the outcome 
4  The outcome of my early research in these issues was my ﬁrst book, Pissarides (1976), based   
  on my PhD thesis at the London School of Economics.
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of a decentralised equilibrium, which may or may not be optimal. It seemed 
to me that the two-sided matching view had a better chance of success, both 
in grounding itself in microeconomic theory and in interpreting the facts 
about unemployment. It allowed one to study equilibrium models that could 
incorporate real-world features like differences across workers and jobs, and 
differences in the institutional structure of labour markets.
The step from a theory of search based on the acceptance of a wage offer, 
and one based on a good match, is small, but has far-reaching implications 
for the modelling of the labour market. The reason is that in the case of 
searching for a good match we can bring in the matching function as a   
description of the choices available to the worker. The matching function 
captures many features of frictions in labour markets that are not made 
explicit. It is a black box, as Barbara Petrongolo and I called it in our 2001 
survey, in the same sense that the production function is a black box of 
technology. But it captures the key idea of a good match: it takes time to ﬁnd 
a good match, the length of time it takes varies across workers in unpredict-
able ways, and if there were more job vacancies available, on average workers 
would ﬁnd a good job match faster. The same applies to ﬁrms looking for 
workers; the matching function treats workers and ﬁrms symmetrically.
Importantly, because the matching function was similar to other aggregate 
functions used in economic models, it became possible to write small 
equilibrium models of the labour market, with frictions captured by the 
matching function. It also became possible to estimate these models with real 
world data. I estimated the matching function with British data, and Olivier 
Blanchard and Peter Diamond estimated it with US data, with encouraging 
results (see Pissarides, 1986, and Blanchard and Diamond, 1989).
TOWARDS AN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
I ﬁrst used the matching function explicitly  in 1979 (Pissarides, 1979),   
making it the main building block of an economy-wide model, at about the 
same time that Peter Diamond and Eric Maskin (1979) used the similar idea 
of the “search technology”. The model of my paper had no wage differen-
tials but it had different methods of search. My main interest was to show   
that with a matching function one could get an interesting, simple model of 
equilibrium vacancies and unemployment without a wage distribution.
But my 1979 paper still had no theory of wages. Soon after, however, it 
seems that all three of us independently realised that since frictions imply 
that the ﬁrm and the worker in a good match enjoy some monopoly power; 
wages need to share it between them. It helped that in the early 1980s, inde-
pendent developments in bargaining theory were working out solutions for 
the splitting of a “cake”.5 The rewards from a good match in the Diamond-
5 Most  inﬂuential among these was Ariel Rubinstein’s (1982) work. A bigger inﬂuence on my   
 research  were  informal discussions with my colleagues at LSE, who also pioneered work   
  in this area, in particular Kenneth Binmore, Avner Shaked and John Sutton. See Binmore,   
 Rubinstein and Asher Wolinski (1986) and Shaked and Sutton (1984).
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Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP) model was the cake that workers and ﬁrms had 
to split.
I attempted the derivation of a wage equation in a search model using 
ideas in bargaining theory. The outcomes were some working papers that 
appeared around 1982, before the electronic era. I was unaware that both 
Peter Diamond (1982) and Dale Mortensen (1982) were working on similar 
issues and were one or two years ahead of me. The wage equation that I was 
deriving from the Nash solution to the wage bargain was virtually identical to 
the wage equation in Diamond’s (1982) paper. Seeing their papers on wages 
and efﬁciency made me switch to another issue that needed to be dealt with 
in an equilibrium model, that of job creation.
JOB CREATION
In both the Diamond (1982) and Mortensen (1982) papers the problem 
investigated was that of a ﬁxed number of workers interacting with a ﬁxed 
number of jobs. Yet, when looking at the workings of real labour markets 
over time, the most striking feature that one sees is how employment and 
job vacancies ﬂuctuate; in other words, how the total number of jobs varies 
over time, depending on economic conditions. In order to make the theory 
applicable to business cycles there was need for a theory of job creation and 
job destruction. In my empirical research with British data (Pissarides, 1986), 
I found that the entry into unemployment was a virtually constant fraction of 
employment.6 Consequently, I focused on the derivation of a variable entry 
into unemployment, through a theory of job creation.
The key feature of the matching model that I made use of was that   
employment was derived as the sum of distinct units called jobs, and not as 
an aggregate that could be chosen as a single unit. A job is an asset owned 
by the ﬁrm: if it is vacant it has some value because it can expect to recruit 
a worker and yield some proﬁt in the future; if it is ﬁlled it is producing for 
proﬁt. Vacant jobs are like nascent investment projects that have not started 
yielding a return yet. If their net value is positive, the ﬁrm can create them 
for proﬁt; if it is negative, it is losing money from them, so it makes sense 
to close them down. It follows that an equilibrium number of jobs could be 
derived from the condition that the value of a new job vacancy must be zero.7
When the zero-proﬁt condition for new vacancies is combined with the 
Nash wage equation it gives an equilibrium wage rate and job creation rate 
that depend on the frictions as summarised in the matching function, and 
on all the other variables that inﬂuence labour market outcomes in standard 
models, such as productivity and taxes. From this condition I can get the 
equilibrium ratio of vacancies to unemployment, called tightness and usually 
denoted by the Greek letter T See Figure 1: the zero-proﬁt condition slopes 
6  This feature of the data changed dramatically in the years that followed. See Petrongolo and   
 Pissarides  (2008).
7  See Pissarides (1984, 1985) for the ﬁrst applications of the “zero-proﬁt condition” to close   
 the  model.
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down because at lower wage rates, jobs are more proﬁtable and more vacan-
cies are created; the wage equation slopes up because at higher tightness 
workers are more likely to locate an alternative job offer and ﬁrms are less 
likely to locate an alternative worker if the wage bargain fails, so the worker’s 
hand in the wage bargain strengthens.
BEVERIDGE CURVE EQUILIBRIUM
The transition from a model that yields an equilibrium ratio of vacancies to 
unemployment to one that yields an equilibrium unemployment, is made 
through the Beveridge curve. The Beveridge curve shows combinations of 
vacancies and unemployment that are consistent with equality between the 
entry into unemployment with the exit from it. This implies that once on 
the Beveridge curve, unemployment is not changing, unless one of the ﬂows 
(in or out) changes because of an exogenous shock. When the entry into 
unemployment is a constant fraction of employment, as we are still assuming, 
the shape and properties of the Beveridge curve are essentially given by 
the aggregate matching function. At higher vacancy rate there are more 
matches between a given number of unemployed workers and job vacancies. 
Unemployment falls because of the increased exit from it, and as employ-
ment rises, the entry into unemployment also rises. A new point is reached 
with a lower unemployment rate, more job matches taking place, and more 
workers entering unemployment.
The Beveridge curve is shown in ﬁgure 2. The convex shape is due to 
the constant returns satisﬁed by the aggregate matching function. To ﬁnd 
equilibrium unemployment I need to know at what point on the curve the 
economy will settle. But since I already have an equilibrium value for the 
ratio of vacancies to unemployment from the job creation condition, I can 
ﬁnd that point immediately. I draw a line through the origin with slope the 
equilibrium T, and the intersection of the Beveridge curve with this line is 









Figure 1. Equilibrium wages and market tightness.
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At the core of this economy are the frictions that characterise the labour 
market. These frictions are the forces that keep the Beveridge curve away 
from the origin. The frictions could be due to a number of factors, such as 
mismatch between the skill requirements of jobs and the skill mix of the   
unemployed, differences in location, the institutional structure of an economy 
with regard to the transmission of information about jobs, and others. An 
economy characterised by more frictions has a Beveridge curve further away 
from the origin than an economy with fewer frictions. 
Because of frictions, jobs that compete for the same workers could have 
different productivities and yet survive in equilibrium. In frictionless markets 
only the most productive of these jobs survive, as competition drives the 
wages  in all jobs to the wage offered by the most productive. Workers 
search for the best job that they can ﬁnd. In models that allow for different   
productivities, the position of the Beveridge curve is also affected by the 
incentives that workers have to search for and accept jobs. The matching rate 
in these models depends on two factors, making contact with a ﬁrm looking 
for workers and ﬁnding the ﬁrm’s offer acceptable.
In an economy where workers do not have strong incentives to accept an 
offer quickly, for example because they are generously compensated without 
preconditions by the unemployment insurance system, the Beveridge curve 
lies further away from the origin. An income support policy that does not 
impose preconditions is called a passive policy. But policies that support the 
unemployed during search, and also provide incentives for more intensive 
job search, can shift the Beveridge towards the origin, and improve the 
performance of the labour market in matching workers to jobs. In this case 
policies are called “active”
A leader in the implementation of active labour market policies is Sweden, 
which spends far more than other advanced countries on bringing unemployed 
workers to jobs. In contrast, up to the 1980s most countries supported the 
unemployed through passive policies, with poor outcomes in the recession of 








Figure 2. The Beveridge curve and equilibrium vacancies and unemployment.
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course of the 1990s, following the poor performance of their labour markets 
in the 1980s.
COMPARING ECONOMIES OVER SPACE AND TIME
We can use the model to compare two economies, one with more frictions 
and passive policies with one with fewer frictions and active policies. The 
ﬁrst economy has a Beveridge curve further away from the origin. It also has 
fewer job vacancies for each unemployed worker, because ﬁrms expect to 
take longer to ﬁll a vacancy. Figure 3 compares these two economies. The 
economy with more frictions is shown with the broken lines. An important 
conclusion is that the economy with more frictions has more unemployment 
than the economy with fewer frictions, but the two economies may have a 
similar level of vacancies.
This conclusion can be contrasted with the comparison of two economies at 
different levels of aggregate economic activity, demand or supply. A lower 
level of aggregate activity implies lower proﬁtability from new jobs. Job crea-
tion falls and this rotates the job creation line clockwise, but the Beveridge 
curve does not move. Equilibrium unemployment increases and vacancies 
fall in response to this shock.
The different response of vacancies to more frictions and lower level of 
aggregate activity was used by a number of authors to identify the reasons for 
the rise in unemployment in different countries. Richard Jackman, Richard 
Layard and Pissarides (1989) ﬁrst used it to argue that the rise in unemploy-
ment in Britain in the 1980s, after the initial big surge associated with Prime 
Minister Thatcher’s restrictive monetary and ﬁscal policies, took place at 
more or less constant vacancies. This is shown in Figure 4. The underlying 
reasons must have been related to increased frictions in the labour market. 
These could be associated with increased mismatch, as the transformation 
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of the economy from an industrial to a service one intensiﬁed, and to more 
generous income support for the unemployed.
It was also very likely due to the build-up of long-term unemployment, which 
disillusions the unemployed and damages the incentives they have to look 
for work. Long-term unemployment, meaning unemployment that lasts for 
a year or more, is a serious consequence of recession that disenfranchises 
workers from the labour force and prolongs the impact that recession has on 
the quality of the workforce. It can explain why the unemployment rate in 
Britain was not falling in the 1980s when the rest of the economy was boom-
ing. Governments realised the negative impact of long-term unemployment, 
and since then they have tried to contain it with active labour market poli-
cies.8 For this reason, more recent recessions do not exhibit the big shifts in 
the Beveridge curve and the long persistence of the negative shocks in the 
labour market.
We can see this contrast for Britain when we compare the economy’s 
responses to the recession of 2008, in Figure 5. Although other reforms took 
place in Britain following the recession of the early 1980s, active policy also 
played an important role in containing long-term unemployment. The path 
of the economy in the Beveridge diagram in the recent recession is a typical 
example of the response of an economy to a negative aggregate shock.
8 Several  countries adopted such policies, led by the Nordic countries. See OECD (2007) for   
 an  update.
Figure 4. The British Beveridge curve, 1975–1984.
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The British experience contrasts sharply with the experience of the United 
States. Katharine Abraham and Lawrence Katz (1986) used unemployment 
and vacancy data for the United States9 to argue that the business cycles of 
the 1970s and 1980s were due to aggregate shocks and not sectoral shocks, 
as argued by David Lillien (1982) and others. Sectoral shocks would have 
similar implications to mismatch shocks. But the economy in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s was tracing a Beveridge curve in the south-eastern direction, 
as implied by an aggregate shock (see Figure 6).
9   The vacancy data were derived from the Conference Board Help-Wanted Index. See their 
article for more details.
Figure 5. The British Beveridge curve, 2008–2010.
Figure 6. The US Beveridge Curve, 1975–1984.
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In the 2008 recession, the US economy started off on a downward southeast-
ern direction, but after the initial shock it traced an increase in unemploy-
ment at more or less constant vacancies. It is still too soon to conclude that 
this is a shift of the Beveridge curve to the right, but if it was it would be a 
feature of intensifying frictions in the United States labour market, which 
have not yet been identiﬁed (Figure 7). The rise in vacancies and recovery 
in output at virtually constant unemployment rate explain why the fragile 
recovery has been described as “jobless”.
WAGE STICKINESS
The response of unemployment to shocks is bigger when wages are sticky. Do 
markets with frictions have anything new to say about wage stickiness? I am 
talking here about real wage stickiness, although similar arguments should 
apply to nominal wage stickiness.
In frictionless markets there are no compelling reasons for wage   
stickiness. In contrast, in markets with frictions and Nash wage bargains there 
is a built-in reason for some wage stickiness. It is that the wage rate depends 
on the worker’s non-market returns, which include unemployment insurance 
income, the value of home activities like home decoration or childcare, and 
the value of extra leisure, like more sleep. The payoffs from these activities 
are not cyclical. When the market payoffs go down because of recession, the 
home payoffs remain high, and this stops the Nash wage rate short of falling 
by as much as the market payoffs.
I explored this wage stickiness in my 1985 paper to derive cyclical ﬂuctua-
tions in unemployment in the model with frictions. But as Robert Shimer 
(2005) has shown, it is not enough to explain all the ampliﬁcation of the 
shocks required to match the data. Subsequent work has shown that it can be 
enough but only if the ﬁrm’s proﬁt share from the match is very small, either 
Figure 7. The US Beveridge curve, 2008–2010.
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because workers take most of the share or because ﬁrms have large labour 
hiring costs (Marcus Hagedorn and Iourii Manovskii, 2008, Pissarides, 2009).
But markets with frictions can justify another form of wage stickiness, 
much more substantial than the one implied by the Nash wage equation. 
This was ﬁrst explored by Robert Hall (2005), who argued that since the 
monopoly power implied by frictions implies that there are no conventional 
supply and demand functions to tie down the wage rate, the Nash wage is 
only one possible outcome consistent with equilibrium. Another is the wage 
that depends on the historical median hiring wage, and shocks to demand 
do not necessarily change it by much. Hall showed that the wage stickiness 
consistent with this argument is enough to give an equilibrium that delivers 
all the ampliﬁcation of shocks on job creation that we see in the data.
This analysis re-opens the issue of wage determination and puts it 
into central stage as a topic for future research. Given the many possibilities   
allowed by the bilateral monopoly nature of a good match, research needs to 
be driven by empirical studies of wage determination for new hires at different  
phases of the cycle (see Christian Haefke, Marcus Sonntag and Thijs van 
Rens, 2007).
JOB DESTRUCTION
New establishment data by Steven Davis and John Haltiwanger (1990) and 
others working in Industrial Organisation, published in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, showed that job destruction rates varied a lot across business 
cycles. The main cause of job destruction and the biggest number were 
connected with  idiosyncratic establishment-speciﬁc shocks, but there was 
enough variation over the business cycle to render untenable the assumption 
that the rate at which workers ﬂow into unemployment is constant. Although 
the rate of job destruction determined the job ﬂow, and not the worker ﬂow 
into unemployment, the two are closely connected. Anyway, subsequent work 
showed that ﬂows into unemployment were cyclical too, although not as   
cyclical as the ﬂow out of unemployment (see Shigeru Fujita and Garey 
Ramey, 2009).
Following a criticism by Mortensen (1992) of the assumption of a constant 
ﬂow rate of workers into unemployment in the ﬁrst edition of my book 
(Pissarides, 1990), we came together to work on extending the model to a 
variable job destruction rate. The outcome was our 1994 paper (Mortensen 
and Pissarides, 1994) and a series of papers that applied the model to several 
issues (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999).
In our analysis of job destruction we assumed that once jobs are created, 
they cannot easily adapt to new technologies. In the simplest version of the 
model they do not adapt at all, so the ﬁrm keeps the job going for as long 
as it is still proﬁtable. When shocks hit that make a job unproﬁtable, it is 
destroyed, the worker is made unemployed, and some new job is established 
elsewhere to take its place.
We have shown that like the job acceptance decision in the ﬁrst generation 
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of search models, the job destruction decision was governed by a reservation 
productivity. The ﬁrm and the worker agreed which jobs to destroy on the 
basis of their joint real return. Under our rules, most job destruction in the 
steady state is due to unidentiﬁed idiosyncratic shocks, as in the data. But 
over the cycle, job destruction goes up in recession, usually with a sudden 
upsurge of terminations when the news ﬁrst breaks out, and goes down in the 
recovery phase. This introduces cyclicality in both the job creation and job 
destruction rate, predicting well the time series data for the United States.
The variable job destruction rate has implications for the dynamics of 
unemployment and the Beveridge curve, but it does not affect the dynamics 
of the job creation rate that I discussed earlier in this lecture. It also implies 
that there is now an incentive to search on the job and move from one job 
to another without experiencing unemployment. The reason is that workers 
have an incentive to leave the jobs that are becoming obsolete, or have low 
proﬁtability for other reasons. The full model is set out in the second edition 
of my book (Pissarides, 2000). Rather than discuss the full model here, I will 
discuss the implications of employment protection legislation for unemploy-
ment and job ﬂows. This is one policy whose study needs the extended model 
with variable job destruction rates, since its objective is to make job destruc-
tion more difﬁcult for the ﬁrm, with the objective of securing a longer-lasting 
employment spell for the worker.
EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION
Although all advanced countries exercise some kind of employment pro-
tection, there are large variations in the type of restrictions implemented 
and there are also big differences in their severity across countries (see Per 
Skedinger, 2010, for a full analysis). At the risk of oversimplifying, we know 
from the OECD that the southern European countries have much stricter 
employment protection legislation than the northern countries, and espe-
cially than the United States and United Kingdom (OECD, 1999). I will dis-
cuss here the restrictions on dismissals that take the form of administrative 
procedures that cost the ﬁrm time and money. These can be represented in 
our models as a pure tax paid by the ﬁrm at the time of dismissal.10
A tax on dismissals reduces job separations. Some low-productivity jobs 
that would have been destroyed before the imposition of the tax will now 
not be destroyed, as the ﬁrm reduces its reservation productivity to reduce 
the chances that it might have to pay the tax. So one implication of employ-
ment protection legislation is that the size of the ﬂow into unemployment 
is lower than otherwise; but average labour productivity is also lower and 
10   In the simple model there is no obvious beneﬁt to the worker from these administrative   
 restrictions on dismissal, other than saving some jobs from destruction. But in more general   
 models  with risk aversion these restrictions also can act as insurance against sudden income   
 ﬂuctuations, and these can be beneﬁcial to the worker. The welfare implications of   
 employment  protection legislation would then be different in these models. See Pissarides   
  (2010) for one such model.
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wages should also be lower to compensate the ﬁrm for the tax and the lower 
productivity.
Another important impact of employment protection legislation is on job 
creation. When the ﬁrm is creating a job it expects to have to pay the tax in 
some future date if it has to dismiss the worker. Job creation falls as a result, 
so just like the ﬂow into unemployment, the ﬂow out of unemployment at 
given unemployment also falls.
The net impact on unemployment depends on which ﬂow falls more. If 
the ﬂow into unemployment falls more than the ﬂow out of unemployment, 
unemployment falls to compensate, and vice versa. Empirical work shows 
that the impact of employment protection legislation on unemployment is 
small and can go either way; but the size of the ﬂows falls, there is less labour 
and job turnover, lower average labour productivity and longer durations of 
both unemployment and employment (OECD, 1999).
In extended versions of our models, with training, the longer durations 
of employment might encourage more training, as workers are more secure 
in their jobs and are more willing to undertake training that is speciﬁc to 
the needs of their ﬁrm. And in yet other extended versions with different 
kinds of workers, employment protection legislation tends to beneﬁt primary 
workers, usually male workers over 25 years old, but hurts other workers, like 
women and youths, who go in and out of the labour force at more frequent 
intervals than prime-age males.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: WHERE DO WE GO NEXT?
Search and matching theory has come a long way since the early 1980s, when 
the ﬁrst equilibrium matching models appeared in the literature. A recent 
book by Brian and John McCall that surveys the economics of search is 550 
pages long, and there was a second volume planned for the things left out 
(McCall and McCall, 2008).
But there is still a lot to do. We have discovered, just as Sir John Hicks did 
in 1932, that the theory of wages is key to understanding the functioning of 
labour markets. Sir John described in detail how frictions in labour markets, 
mobility costs and trade unions and other institutions inﬂuence wages, and 
how wages inﬂuence employment, very much along the lines that modern 
theory describes. But modern theory has still to explore more fully the role 
of institutions in its formal models, and this is an area of research that should 
attract a lot of attention in the future.
I have also argued that wage stickiness is as important an issue as it has 
ever been in macroeconomics. Markets with frictions open up many more 
possibilities for wage stickiness and future research needs to explore these.
The ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 has thrown open the question of the interaction 
between capital and labour markets. Equilibrium matching models are 
built on the assumption of perfect capital markets. The implied arbitrage 
equations under perfect foresight and unlimited borrowing and lending 
are used to calculate a value for jobs and workers. These are good starting   
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assumptions, and they have yielded important results. But future work needs to 
explore other assumptions about capital markets, and integrate the ﬁnancial 
sector with the labour market. This might suggest another ampliﬁcation 
mechanism for shocks, independently from wage stickiness or ﬁxed costs.
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